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PAVING STREETS FOR THE POOR: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF
INFRASTRUCTURE EFFECTS
Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Climent Quintana-Domeque*
Abstract—We provide the first experimental estimation of the effects of the
supply of publicly financed urban infrastructure on property values. Using
random allocation of first-time street asphalting of residential streets located
in peripheral neighborhoods in Mexico, we show that within two years of
the intervention, households are able to transform their increased property
wealth into significantly larger rates of vehicle ownership, household appli-
ances, and home improvements. Increased consumption is made possible
by both credit use and less saving. A cost-benefit analysis indicates that the
valuation of street asphalting as capitalized into property values is about as
large as construction costs.
I. Introduction
TWO concomitant facts about the developing world meritattention. The first is that urbanization is proceeding
rapidly in many developing countries (Henderson, 2002).
The second is that a large proportion of the urban poor
throughout the developing world does not benefit from basic
urban equipment such as piped water, electricity, sewerage
lines, and asphalted roads (UN-Habitat, 2003). Given these
two widespread phenomena, the dearth of empirical studies
on the effect of infrastructure for the living conditions of the
urban poor is remarkable. Our aim in this paper is to help
fill this gap.
In pursuing this endeavor, we must acknowledge the
two main difficulties in evaluating the effects of public
infrastructure on the lives of the poor. Infrastructure allo-
cation normally occurs in places that provide the highest
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returns, either political or economic (e.g., Duflo & Pande,
2007; Joanis, 2011). Hence, any promising attempt to mea-
sure its impacts requires the use of a credible source of
exogenous variation in its provision. Not only that, we
need data before and after the provision of infrastructure
to distinguish genuine improvements in living conditions of
individuals benefited by infrastructure from neighborhood
recomposition effects, in which families leave their homes
or new neighbors arrive in response to the local public good
(Tiebout, 1956).
We overcome these two obstacles by combining a ran-
domized infrastructure experiment (provision of first-time
asphalting of streets in inhabited residential neighborhoods)
with the collection of data from a dedicated survey before
(2006) and after (2009) the intervention.1 The intervention
takes place in Acayucan, Mexico, where the city expands
its pavement grid over time by street asphalting projects,
each defined as a contiguous set of unpaved street seg-
ments connecting to the existing pavement grid. Figures 1
and 2 illustrate the intervention under analysis. From the
public works office’s set of 56 candidate street asphalting
projects, we randomly selected half of them to be treated
with pavement using simple randomization.2
The first contribution of this paper is to provide the
first experimental estimation of the effects of the supply
of publicly financed urban infrastructure on property val-
ues.3 We document substantial property value gains among
properties lining newly paved streets compared to control
streets. Using professional appraisals, we find that plots
increased in value by 0.54 log points (or 72%),4 represent-
ing a 17% increase in property values (the sum of land
and structure). According to homeowner valuations, we esti-
mate an effect of street pavement on property values of
28%. Two other pieces of market-value information point
in the same direction: rents raised by 36% in paved streets,
and for the houses that were purchased between 2006 and
2009, the price paid was 85 log points (or 134%) higher
on paved streets, although the coefficient on this last mea-
sure is not statistically significant on account of the limited
number of transactions. Our experimental findings contribute
to the literature on the property value effects of infrastruc-
ture, which typically relies on observational studies using
1 Asphalting of streets is also known as road surface or pavement.
2 We assigned half to intent to treatment and half to control using simple
randomization by means of a random number generator function in MS
Excel.
3 While there is an extensive literature assessing the effects of infras-
tructure on economic outcomes, at both the macrolevel (Haughwout, 2002;
Donaldson, forthcoming; Duranton & Turner, 2012) and the microlevel (Van
de Walle, 2002; Davis, 2011; Dinkelman, 2011; Duflo & Pande, 2007), none
of the previous studies provides experimental evidence.
4 exp(0.54) − 1 = 0.72.
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Figure 1.—Before Pavement
Figure 2.—After Pavement
difference-in-differences strategies (Billings, 2011; Gibbons
& Machin, 2005).
From an economic development perspective, our sec-
ond contribution is to show the fact that the provision of
infrastructure—in our case, first-time asphalting of streets—
had sizable positive effects on households’ acquisition of
household appliances, motor vehicle ownership, and home
improvements. Indeed, we find that motor vehicle owner-
ship went from one in every four households to one in every
three, the number of home appliances owned by the house-
hold increased by 12%, and home improvements doubled.
All of these changes point to a reduction in material poverty.
Our third contribution is to offer an explanation for
the observed changes in household behavior: significant
increases in household appliances, the number of home
improvements, and the acquisition of motorized vehicles.
We investigate the role of credit use in explaining durable
goods consumption by means of a correlational analysis. Our
focus on credit is motivated by several observations: (a) the
increase in property values, (b) the fact that homeowners rep-
resent 95% of the households in our sample, (c) the doubling
of collateral-based credit use from financial institutions,5 (d)
the absence of effects on transportation costs or labor market
outcomes, and (e) the fact that banks in Mexico offer home
equity lines of credit.6
One possibility is that the increase in property values led to
credit constraint relaxations. We indeed observe a correlation
between credit use and durable good acquisition, but this
happens only for households that were already using credit
at baseline. For households not using credit at baseline, the
effects are present only for household appliances, but these
are precisely the goods less likely to be financed by secured
loans (and more likely to be financed through dissaving or
nonsecured loans). Hence, we interpret the overall evidence
as pointing to a wealth effect rather than to a relaxation of
credit constraints as the main force behind the increase in
durable goods consumption.
In the last section of the paper, we perform a cost-benefit
analysis by summing up the increases in land values of plots
along paved streets using our most conservative estimate
of the effect on land values. The comparison of benefits to
construction costs reveals that street paving had a benefit-to-
cost ratio of 1.09, and we cannot reject that it is equal to 1.
According to the public finance literature on the valuation of
public goods based on property value capitalization (Cellini,
Ferreira, & Rothstein, 2010), our estimated ratio is consistent
with an efficient level of public good provision.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II
describes the experimental design. Section III explains the
empirical strategy and investigates the potential experi-
mental effects on neighborhood recomposition. Section IV
contains the analysis of the experimental effects. Section
V explores why households changed their consumption
in response to pavement provision. Section VI reports a
cost-benefit analysis. Finally, section VII concludes.
II. Experimental Design
A. Institutional Context
Acayucan is one of Mexico’s 56 metropolitan areas
encompassing three municipalities with a combined pop-
ulation of 105,000 (INEGI, 2007). The city has a central
core where most streets have been paved, and outer sections
where street pavement is gradually rolled out. Residences are
built and inhabited long before streets are paved, as shown in
5 Loan size across all adults went from virtually 0 to 1,643 pesos (200
U.S. dollars at 2009 PPP exchange rate), equivalent to 2 months per capita
expenditure.
6 Loans with real estate collateral offer up to 50% of the assessed property
value.
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figure 1. This situation is common throughout Mexico and
other Latin American countries (Fernandes, 2011), suggest-
ing that the results from our analysis are potentially relevant
for many other countries. Compared to other localities of
similar size in Mexico, housing indicators in Acayucan are
practically identical to the average. However, there is less
manufacturing in Acayucan than in the average city, and
incomes are lower.7
Municipal governments in Mexico are responsible for
most of the elements of their urban infrastructure. Each
three-year administration has ample leeway as to bud-
getary allocations. The municipal budget consists mainly
of transfers from general funds obtained from the federal
value-added tax, the federal income tax, and oil revenues.
Less than 10% of the municipal budget derives from local
taxes (consisting of the property tax and business permit
fees). Property tax receipts, especially in small cities, play
a less significant role in Mexico than they do in the United
States. Furthermore, cadastral property valuations are very
low and rarely updated.
B. The Experiment
The intervention consists of first-time asphalting of res-
idential nonarterial streets, varying in width from 8 to 15
meters, and allowing for two lanes of vehicular traffic and
one or two lanes for parking. The pavement material used
is either hot-mix asphalt concrete or portland cement rein-
forced concrete. Like most other infrastructure, the lion’s
share of costs is borne initially. The transportation literature
estimates annual cost of maintenance to be only 1.5% of con-
struction costs (BITRE, 1978), or 0.3% to 0.7% using the
cost estimates in Chen, Lin, and Luo (2003). After a street
is paved, maintenance is a municipal responsibility and is
funded from general revenues.
Street pavement in an urban context provides multiple ser-
vices. It facilitates vehicle, pedestrian, and cyclist movement
and access; provides accessible space for vehicle parking;
allows commercial vehicles to deliver goods; and has a
significant impact on the visual appearance of the area.
Fieldwork confirmed that congestion was not a concern—as
expected given the residential nature of the streets. A valid
question, then, is why the market does not provide street
pavement to begin with. One reason is that residential street
pavement is a pure public good (nonrivalrous and nonex-
cludable), and hence, free-rider incentives prevent private
provision.8
The government of Acayucan faced budget and tempo-
ral constraints that would not allow it to pave all streets
that were deemed suitable candidates. In fact, the public
7 Comparisons based on the 2005 Mexican Census—CONTEO. See
Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque (2015).
8 While the nature of the roads that were paved (residential and arterial)
meant that we never observed congestion, this does not take away from
the more general phenomenon that this type of policy may lead to more
congested roads in the downtown areas.
Figure 3.—Acayucan Street Projects
works office had a set of 56 independent street pavement
project candidates located throughout the city: contiguous
unpaved street segments that connected with the existing
city pavement grid and with relatively high population den-
sities. These pavement projects ranged from 300 to 1,200
meters in length.
Given that the administration could afford to pay for only
28 of the 56 projects, the mayor and the city council reasoned
that it would be in everybody’s interest (not only for a third
party) to evaluate the paving program, but also for the same
third party to select, at random, the 28 streets to be paved. We
assigned 28 streets to intent to treatment and 28 to control
using simple randomization by means of a random number
generator function in MS Excel. Figure 3 shows the location
of those streets assigned to the intent-to-treat group (Z = 1)
and those assigned to the control group (Z = 0).
It is important to bear in mind that every municipal admin-
istration in Acayucan allocates a portion of its budget to
street paving, but the municipality did not announce to
the population the list of experimental street projects. In
other words, the selection was not legally binding in any
way that could be announced to the population, but rather
served as an internal guideline in the annual budgeting pro-
cess. While this eliminates potential biases from anticipation
effects in the housing values at baseline, people living in
an intent-to-treat street could have learned they were part
of the intent-to-treat group with the arrival of measurement
teams, construction crews, and machinery. We investigate
below whether anticipation effects are present among units
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assigned to treatment but finally unpaved. We also note that
streets not selected for pavement did not receive any form
of compensation. Indeed, the pavement program was not
accompanied by any other government intervention.
By February 2009, right before our follow-up survey,
seventeen of the streets in the treatment group had been
completely paved and the other eleven were under way (the
municipal government attributed the delays to foul weather
and various technical difficulties).9 However, and most
important, the administration did fulfill the requirement of
not paving streets assigned to the control group.
C. Data Sources
The data for this study come from pre- and post-
intervention rounds of a dedicated household survey (the
Acayucan Standards of Living Survey, ASLS) and profes-
sional appraisals of residential property values.10 Importantly
for our purposes, the part of the ASLS questionnaire focused
on consumption and income is very detailed, following the
Mexico National Survey of Household Income and Expendi-
ture (ENIGH, Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los
Hogares). The baseline survey was fielded in February and
March 2006, and the follow-up survey was fielded in Febru-
ary and March 2009. Professional appraisals were performed
immediately after the survey work in each round.11
The target population of the survey consisted of all occu-
pied residential structures on the streets selected for the
experiment.12 The baseline survey was administered to 1,231
households living in 1,193 dwellings, with a response rate
of 94%.13 In 2009, 1,083 households were interviewed. In
900 cases we found the same household that we had inter-
viewed in 2006, and in 156 cases we found that a new
household was in residence. In order to assess neighbor-
hood recomposition occurring on account of newcomers
moving into new constructions, all families living in res-
idences built between baseline and follow-up were also
9 All eleven projects were visited by the measurement teams. In addition,
in two of them, construction crews started their tasks.
10 A description of the ASLS can be found in Gonzalez-Navarro and
Quintana-Domeque (2015).
11 A very short business census was applied to all business units whose
main entrance faced one of the street projects in 2006 and 2009. Mobile
business units were excluded from analysis (e.g., a seller on a motorcycle
or a water distributor going around on a truck). Results based on these data
(available in table A6 of the online appendix) do not reveal any effects on
businesses.
12 We created a sampling frame from all inhabited residential dwellings
in January 2006. As Angus Deaton (1997) recognizes, the use of outdated
or otherwise inaccurate sampling frames is an important source of error in
survey estimates. The sampling procedure was clustered sampling: From
the list of dwellings in each cluster, we chose at random a specified fraction
to be interviewed.
13 Some dwellings contained more than one household (defined as a group
of one or more persons living in the same house and sharing food expen-
ditures). The procedure in the case of such multiple households was to
interview all of them. It is worth noting that neither quota sampling nor
substitution of nonresponding households or individuals (whether refusals
or non-contacts) was permitted at any stage.
interviewed (N = 27). Table A1 (online appendix) details
survey response rates.14
The household questionnaire collects detailed information
for each individual in the household and characteristics at
the household level. In over 95% of the cases, household
and individual questions were answered by a reference per-
son who was thus targeted because he or she was either the
household head or the spouse or partner of the head.
We did not inform participants in the study (household
respondents and the professional appraiser) about the ulti-
mate objective of the survey and appraisals.15 We also trained
field workers not to use the phrase street pavement to respon-
dents. Thus, any behavioral bias among the treatment group
(Hawthorne effects) and among the control group (John
Henry effects) was minimized.
Measuring property values. The main challenge in
assessing changes in property values occurring in small geo-
graphical areas over a short time span is the paucity of
transactions. Moreover, in the case of a developing country,
transactions registered in the state property registry are unre-
liable indicators of transaction prices, since the term often
used is gift, donation, or inheritance, in order to reduce reg-
istration fees. Even for properties registered as having been
sold, there is a substantial delay in many cases between the
date of the transaction and the date of registry. It is often the
case that an individual buys and moves into a house and only
later pays the registration fee. In the United States, in con-
trast, property registries are the main data source for home
price indices (Case & Shiller, 1987). Again, however, these
registries are useful for assessing changes in property values
only over large geographical areas, such as entire cities.
To compensate for the small number of transactions to
be expected in our setting, we obtained two independent
measures of property value: professional appraisals and
homeowner valuations. The fact that professional appraisals
are used by banks to determine property values, and hence
the size of mortgages, indicates that they are a reliable source
of market valuation. In our case, we used the services of a
professional appraiser contracted by local banks who is also
a real estate agent in the city.16 Each appraisal consisted of
a visit by the expert to the property and a careful evaluation
of the approximate sale price of the property. Appraisers
define market value as “the most probable price, as of a
specified date, in cash, for which the specified property
rights should sell after reasonable exposure in a competitive
14 We determined that there was a risk that not all of the streets selected
for treatment would in fact be treated by the time of the follow-up survey.
Indeed, there were eleven such cases. In order to maximize the power of
our tests, sampling was done with a higher intensity in the intent-to-treat
group (List, Sadoff, & Wagner, 2011). We sampled at a rate of 70% in the
intent-to-treat group and at a rate of 50% in the control group.
15 The data collected for this study underwent the approval process of
the Institutional Review Panel at Princeton University (Research Protocol
3104). At the end of the experiment, we debriefed the appraiser about the
purposes of the study.
16 We used the services of the same agent in 2006 and 2009 in order to
minimize heterogeneity of assessment practices.
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market under all conditions requisite to fair sale, with the
buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and
for self-interest, and assuming that neither is under undue
duress.”17 We obtained professional appraisals of residential
property (and land) value for half of the successfully inter-
viewed households (578 properties) on account of budgetary
constraints.18
The second main source of property valuation we obtained
were homeowners’ self-reports. There is an established lit-
erature in economics using self-reported home values (see
Davis, 2011, for a recent example). The reliability of self-
reported home values has long been assessed in the housing
economics literature (in developed countries, see Kish &
Lansing, 1954; Kain & Quigley, 1972; Goodman & Ittner,
1992; Kiel & Zabel, 1999; Bucks & Pence, 2006; Banzhaf
& Farooque, 2012; in developing countries, see Jimenez,
1982). This literature concludes that the evolution of self-
reported housing values generally mimics that of actual
prices. In the ASLS, we asked, “Approximately how much
money do you think this house could sell for nowadays?” For
the 2006 ASLS sample, Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-
Domeque (2009) show that owners overestimate the value
of their homes relative to the appraiser but that the bias is
explained by long tenure: short-tenured homeowners provide
value assessments that are on average the same as those of
the professional appraisals.19 This suggests the professional
appraiser’s valuation is a better indicator of market value.
Finally, to circumvent the drawbacks of our previous mea-
sures due to homeowner self-reported biases (e.g., priming
effects) and potentially mechanical assessor models for valu-
ing properties, we complement homeowners’ self-reports
and assessor valuations with data on transaction prices paid
by recent buyers and housing rental rates. Data on recent
transactions are obtained by asking recent buyers—those
arriving between baseline and follow-up—how much they
paid for the property. Housing rental rates are obtained by
asking renters how much they pay per month in rent. This last
measure has the advantage of overcoming the worry regard-
ing the forward-looking behavior of house price data—that
the control group was effectively treated (at least with some
nonzero probability and some discounting for the fact that
the treatment is delayed) too.
Consumption and credit measures. Consumption of non-
durable goods is measured by monthly household per
capita expenditure. We have two measures of per capita
17 Section A2 in the online appendix includes a copy of one of the assess-
ment forms used by the assessor. It includes a set of boxes to check, and
“paved street” is one of them.
18 From the household survey we conducted, we simply ordered all house-
holds we interviewed and selected for appraisal one out of every two. We did
not have enough funds to appraise all properties. Doing one out of every two
also guaranteed we had observations in all clusters. The appraiser did not
enter the properties because piloting revealed that nonparticipation would
be extremely high, which would have compromised our entire evaluation.
19 In the 2009 sample, the mean difference between log appraised value
and log homeowner valuation is −0.39 for the whole sample and only −0.04
for short-tenured homeowners (≤ 5 years living in the dwelling).
expenditure: one indirect measure, based on expenditures
on eight major items (food, phone, gas, electricity, edu-
cation, rent or mortgage, clothes, and entertainment), and
one direct measure, based on total reported expenditures.
Durable goods consumption is measured using two indices:
one of vehicle ownership (the sum of automobile, truck, and
motorcycle binary indicators) and one of household appli-
ances (the sum of refrigerator, washing machine, microwave
oven, air conditioning, video player, and computer binary
indicators).
The ASLS asks for credit use at the individual level for all
adults. Credit use and loan size are available for collateral-
based credit (composed of mortgages, home equity lines, and
collateralized bank loans); noncollateralized credit (com-
posed of appliance and furniture store credit, bank card
credit, vehicle loans, and casas de crédito popular loans);
and credit from informal lenders, family and friends, and
government entities. In addition, the ASLS asks whether
anyone in the household has a bank account (checking, direct
deposit, or savings).
To understand our credit measures, it is important to have
a sense of the institutional background on how access to
loans works in Acayucan. In this regard, we note that four of
the five Mexican banks with national coverage were present
in Acayucan from before the time of the study (BBVA,
Banamex, HSBC, and Santander). These banks offer home
equity lines of credit, which are informally called crédito
liquidez and formally known as crédito con garantía hipote-
caria (loans with real estate collateral). These credit lines
offer up to 50% of the assessed property value. In addition
to secured credit, nonsecured credit is quite common in Mex-
ico. Employees are offered a multiple of their monthly wage
by the bank with which they have direct deposit, and major
home appliances are commonly offered on weekly payment
schemes by major retailers such as Elektra. It is also worth
noting that major players in microfinance, such as Compar-
tamos (a bank), and savings cooperatives, such as Caja de
Ahorro Popular Mexicana, are also present in the city.
Other measures. The ASLS also contains information
on labor supply (households respondents are asked, for
instance, to specify the number of hours each adult works
per day or per week), transportation costs (the time it takes to
go to the city center using the usual means of transport and
the price of a taxi from the home to the city center), health
(self-reported symptoms of poor health among household
members over the previous year), and children’s schooling
(school enrollment and absenteeism).
III. Empirical Strategy
A. Baseline Balance, Reduced-Form, and 2SLS estimates
In line with the established impact-evaluation literature
(e.g., Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007), we present reduced-
form (RF) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates. The
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Table 1.—Preintervention Balance in Means
Variable Z = 1 Z = 0 Diff. Variable Z = 1 Z = 0 Diff.
Consumption Credit (cont.)
Monthly log per capita expenditure 6.77 6.69 0.08 Credit card (=1) 0.097 0.087 0.010
(0.073) (0.050) (0.087) (0.026) (0.012) (0.028)
[461] [403] [864] [480] [410] [890]
Monthly log sum of itemized 6.60 6.49 0.11 Bank account (=1) 0.154 0.166 −0.012
expenditures per capita (0.079) (0.045) (0.090) (0.030) (0.018) (0.035)
[474] [409] [883] [481] [410] [891]
Household appliances (0–6) 2.12 2.04 0.08 Labor and transportation
(0.163) (0.075) (0.178) Weekly hours workeda 48.45 47.59 0.86
[487] [413] [900] (1.43) (1.19) (1.84)
Vehicles (car/truck/motorcycle) (0–3) 0.203 0.226 −0.023 [498] [429] [927]
(0.050) (0.033) (0.059) Monthly log labor incomea 7.97 7.80 0.17*
[487] [413] [900] (0.082) (0.051) (0.095)
Home improvements (0–11) 0.541 0.474 0.067 [408] [382] [790]
(0.048) (0.054) (0.071) Plans to migrate in search of work (=1) 0.410 0.418 −0.008
[487] [413] [900] (0.030) (0.022) (0.037)
Bought materials for home improvement (=1) 0.254 0.220 0.034 [431] [370] [801]
(0.022) (0.020) (0.029) Cost of taxi to city center 20.66 20.21 0.45
[485] [409] [894] (0.909) (0.820) (1.21)
Credit [482] [407] [889]
Collateral-based credit (=1)a 0.029 0.027 0.002 Time to city center (minutes) 19.90 20.86 −0.96
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.947) (0.890) (1.29)
[1,047] [937] [1,984] [487] [412] [899]
Collateral-based credit amounta 658 429 229 Housing
(272) (152) (308) Log owner estimate of house value 11.75 11.81 −0.06
[1,047] [937] [1,984] (0.12) (0.10) (0.15)
Noncollateral-based credit (=1)a 0.050 0.034 0.016 [269] [262] [531]
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) Log professional appraisal property 11.64 11.60 0.04
[1,047] [937] [1,984] (0.08) (0.05) (0.10)
Noncollateral-based credit amounta 496 237 259* [295] [253] [548]
(134) (75) (152) Log professional appraisal land 10.27 10.14 0.13
[1,047] [937] [1,984] (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
Credit from family and friends (=1)a 0.006 0.004 0.002 [295] [253] [548]
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) Log rent 6.48 6.53 −0.05
[1,047] [937] [1,984] (0.13) (0.10) (0.16)
Informal private credit (=1)a 0.003 0.007 −0.004 [34] [22] [56]
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) Nearest paved street (street blocks) 1.49 1.35 0.14
[1,047] [937] [1,984] (0.16) (0.15) (0.22)
[487] [411] [898]
For each characteristic X, the average difference (Diff ) is computed as the coefficient of a regression of X on the binary indicator Z; its associated standard error (in parentheses) is clustered at the pavement project
level. Estimation takes survey weights into account. Number of observations is in brackets. Individual variables regarding credit and labor outcomes for individuals aged 18 and over. Significance levels reported only
for Diff : ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. a Individual-level outcomes.
first thing we need to check, however, is whether random-
ization worked as intended, that is, balancing pretreatment
characteristics across the intent-to-treat (Z = 1) and the con-
trol (Z = 0) groups. This is precisely the purpose of table 1,
which reports balance tests for the main outcome variables.
Note that we present balance tests for variables with dif-
ferent units of observation: dwellings, households, and indi-
viduals (sometimes partitioned into adults and children).20
For this reason, the number of observations can vary
20 Variable definitions: nearest paved street (distance in blocks from the
dwelling to the nearest paved street); collateral-based credit (mortgages,
home equity lines, and collateralized bank loans); noncollateralized credit
(appliance and furniture store credit, bank card credit, vehicle loans, and
casas de crédito popular); credit card (bank account): indicator that some-
one in the household has a credit card (bank account); household appliances
(sum of indicators for refrigerator, washing machine, microwave oven, air
conditioning, video player, and computer); vehicles (sum of indicators for
car, truck, and motorcycle); home improvements (sum of indicators for
improvements in flooring, walls, roofing, sewerage connection, plumb-
ing, toilets, electrical installations, room construction, remodeling, security
measures, and improvements to house front); materials purchased for
home improvements (in the previous six months); and time to city center
(self-reported time to commute from home to city center).
substantially from variable to variable. We indicate in table
footnote a whether the variable refers to an individual and
are clear whenever we refer to adults or children. The stayer
sample has 900 households, 1,351 children, 2,362 adults,
and 898 dwellings.
The table shows that randomization was successful in bal-
ancing pretreatment characteristics across the intent-to-treat
and the control groups.21 We assess 53 variables and find
21 The average difference in characteristic X is computed as the coefficient
of a regression of X on the binary indicator Z , and its associated standard
error is clustered at the pavement project level. An alternative test of equality
of means is a two-sample t-test with unequal variances between groups
using Welch’s (1947) approximation. This alternative provides a solution
to the Fisher-Behrens problem of testing the significance of the difference
between the means of two normal populations with different variances. The
standard errors using this alternative test were very similar. See Deaton
(2009) for further discussion. In addition, we perform a joint test for the
randomization check using seemingly unrelated estimation and then testing
the null hypothesis that the preintervention means of the variables that come
from our household survey are the same for both the intent-to-treat (Z = 1)
and control (Z = 0) groups. The corresponding adjusted Wald test has
an F21,34 distribution under the null. We obtain an F-statistic of 1.58, so
we cannot reject the null hypothesis (of no mean differences overall) at
conventional levels of statistical significance.
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evidence of balanced characteristics across the groups (see
table A2 in the online appendix). Only two variables are
individually significantly different across the groups: labor
income and noncollateral-based credit amount, both at the
10% significance level.
We then proceed to estimate reduced-form (RF) effects:
Y2009 = α0 + α1Z + α2Y2006 + 1, (1)
where Y2009 is the outcome of interest in 2009, Z is the
intent-to-treat indicator, and Y2006 is the outcome at baseline,
included to improve precision. Hence, unless otherwise indi-
cated, all of our estimates use the two rounds and not only the
follow-up cross-section. The ITT parameter is α1 in equation
(1). We cluster standard errors at the street pavement project
level (56 clusters).22 We also use survey weights.23
We also present 2SLS estimates using pavement group
assignment as an instrumental variable for the street being
paved, so Z is the excluded instrument for an indicator D of
being paved in the equation:
Y2009 = β0 + β1D + β2Y2006 + 2. (2)
The parameter β1 in equation (2) is the ITT parameter
divided by the regression-adjusted compliance rate (the frac-
tion of units that were finally paved among those originally
selected to be paved) and can be interpreted as the TOT
(treatment-on-the-treated) parameter under the following
three conditions:
C1: One sided non-compliance (Bloom, 1984; Angrist,
Imbens, & Rubin, 1996). Only units assigned to receive
street pavement (Z = 1) can potentially end up being
unpaved (D = 0); all units assigned to the control (Z = 0)
do comply with not being finally paved (D = 0).
C2: Absence of anticipation effects. No average effect of
pavement group assignment (Z = 1) on those units in
streets assigned to be paved that were not finally paved
(Z = 1, D = 0).
C3: Absence of indirect treatment effects. No average effect
of paving on units in the control group (Z = 0).
B. Interpreting 2SLS Estimates as TOT Effects
In the experiment at hand, condition C1 is clearly sat-
isfied. While some streets assigned to the treatment group
were not paved (i.e., 0 < Pr(D = 1|Z = 1) < 1), all the
streets assigned to the control group remained unpaved (i.e.,
Pr(D = 0|Z = 0) = 1).
22 Given that our experiment took place in a context of different-sized
clusters due to differing street project pavement lengths, we also use the
wild cluster bootstrap method (MacKinnon & Webb, 2014). Our clustered
p-values are very similar to the wild cluster bootstrap ones.
23 Survey weights (or expansion factors) represent the inverse of the
probability that a dwelling or household is included in the sample. In
constructing them, the survey firm took into account the proportion of
households selected for participation in each cluster and cluster-specific
nonresponse. The use of weights is immaterial for all of the results because
unit nonresponse was extremely low and uncorrelated to treatment.
Table 2.—Anticipation Effects on Housing Value
Log professional appraisal of property value
Assigned to treatment but unpaved 0.007
(0.036)
[344]
Number of clusters 39
p-value Clustered: 0.854
Wild Bootstrap: 0.800
Log owner estimate of property value
Assigned to treatment but unpaved 0.067
(0.167)
[338]
Number of clusters 38
p-value Clustered: 0.690
Wild Bootstrap: 0.732
Log transaction price recent purchase
Assigned to treatment but unpaved 1.20
(1.26)
[29]
Number of clusters 16
p-value Clustered: 0.355
Wild Bootstrap: 0.652
“Assigned to treatment but unpaved” is a dummy for observations from street projects assigned to
pavement but unpaved by the time of the second survey. The sample consists of street projects assigned
to control and assigned to treatment but unpaved. Regressions include a constant and the corresponding
dependent variable at baseline. Estimation takes survey weights into account. Standard errors clustered
at the pavement project level are in parentheses. Number of observations is in brackets. Wild Boostrap
p-values computed after 500 replications. ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1.
To assess condition C2, whether anticipation effects are
negligible when estimating the effects of street pavement,
the most natural outcome to look at is home value, which
is likely to adjust in anticipation of street pavement provi-
sion. For example, McMillen and McDonald (2004) detect
a house price adjustment, in anticipation of the opening
of a new transit line in Chicago, up to six years before
the actual opening of the line, which coincided with the
announcement of the route for the proposed transit line.
Here, a potential concern (although there was no announce-
ment) is that noncompliers—people living along the ITT
(Z = 1) streets that were not finally paved—learned that
their street had been selected by observing the arrival of
measurement teams and modified their estimates of property
value in 2009. In that case, noncompliers would be affected
by owning a house on a street selected for paving in the near
future, and “being in a selected project” could not be used as
an instrument for “being paved.” The appraiser could have
updated his estimations of such properties as well. Note,
however, that rents have the advantage of overcoming the
worry regarding the forward-looking behavior of house price
data.
We examine the presence of anticipation effects on hous-
ing values by focusing on the subsample of households living
on streets assigned to pavement but finally unpaved (Z = 1,
D = 0) and those living on streets assigned to the con-
trol group (Z = 0). We run a regression of home value
in 2009 on an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if
(Z = 1, D = 0) and 0 if (Z = 0), controlling for the home
value in 2006. Table 2 shows that there is no change in
home values for those homes in the intent-to-treat group that
were not finally paved, suggesting that the expectations of
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Table 3.—Experimental Effects of Street Pavement on Out-Migration Decision and Out-Migrant Characteristics






Out-Migrant Characteristics: Log(PCE) Household Appliances Vehicle Ownership
Mean Control Mean Control Mean Control
RF 2SLS (2006) RF 2SLS (2006) RF 2SLS (2006)
0.059 0.102 6.71 −0.063 −0.109 1.94 0.081 0.139 0.173
(0.117) (0.197) (0.078) (0.231) (0.399) (0.155) (0.074) (0.118) (0.038)
[266] [266] [119] [271] [271] [120] [271] [271] [120]
The RF column uses assignment to pavement (Z) as the independent variable. The 2SLS column instruments pavement status (D) with assignment to pavement (Z). Regressions include a constant. Estimation takes
survey weights into account. Standard errors clustered at the pavement project level are in parentheses. The number of observations is in brackets. Significance levels reported only for RF and 2SLS: ***p-value < 0.01,
**p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1.
noncompliers regarding home values did not change. This
evidence supports condition C2.24
Finally, we need to assess condition C3—whether paving
has an effect on units in the control group. These indirect
effects may operate mainly through property market sort-
ing and connectivity. In the first case, paving a street can
make “undesirable” neighbors concentrate more heavily in
untreated areas, so there could be negative indirect effects
on the property prices of the control group. Regarding con-
nectivity, it is important to acknowledge that distance to the
nearest paved street decreased for the control group, and this
may affect the price for houses in the control group.
To investigate the potential effects of paving on prop-
erty market sorting—whether changes in the desirability and
price of treated properties affect the market price of control
properties through neighborhood recomposition—we inves-
tigate whether the intervention under analysis affected either
the rate or composition of movers in or out of the paved
neighborhood. Column 1 in the top panel of table 3 shows
that out-migration is uncorrelated with intent to treat. Sim-
ilarly, column 2 indicates that out-migration is unrelated
to pavement status.25 The bottom panel in table 3 shows
no statistically significant differences in the means of per
capita expenditure, household appliances, and vehicle own-
ership between out-migrants from control streets and those
from paved streets.26 Regarding immigration flows, in 18%
of the 2006 dwelling sample, we found a new family in
2009.27 The top panel in table 4 shows that the likelihood of
24 Two other possible types of bias due to anticipation effects are the
possibility that members of the control group see their chances of getting
pavement go up (if they had access to the list of projects considered for
potential pavement) and the possibility that members of the treatment group
expected pavement anyway, prior to the program. However, we do not think
these are serious concerns in our context, since to our knowledge, the list of
projects considered for pavement was an internal document to the admin-
istration, and the short time horizon of the administrations means there is a
lot of uncertainty regarding what the politician will actually deliver.
25 Although not reported here, being a renter is the most important correlate
of out-migration in this setting.
26 Differences along other dimensions were also checked, with similar
results.
27 The sampling frame in 2006 was occupied dwellings. In 2009, some of
these dwellings may have been temporarily unoccupied, hence the higher
out-migration than immigration rate.
new households arriving on the experimental streets between
2006 and 2009 is not affected by either intent to treat-
ment or pavement status of the street. In addition, the lower
panel in the table shows that there is no statistically signif-
icant difference in average (socioeconomic) characteristics
of immigrants to intent-to-treatment (or paved) streets and
those arriving to control (or unpaved) streets. Hence, the evi-
dence reported in tables 3 and 4 fails to support that paving
affected the rate or composition of movers in or out of the
paved neighborhood.28
We now assess the importance of connectivity effects,
focusing our analysis on control streets. Figure 4 shows a
positive relationship between changes in home value and
changes in the distance to the nearest paved streets for those
in the control group. Barring a discrete change in the value
of houses in the control areas due to pavement in the treat-
ment areas, we estimate the following model for the homes
in the group assigned to control (Z = 0):
Y2009 = γ0 + γ1Δd + γ2Y2006 + 3,
where Y2009 is appraised home value in 2009 and Δd is the
change in distance to the nearest paved street between 2006
and 2009 (measured in street blocks). The connectivity effect
is captured by γ1. Our estimate for γ1 is −0.034 (SE =
0.025), so that a decrease of one street block in the distance
between a given house and the pavement grid is correlated
with a 3% higher housing value. Given that the average
reduction in distance to the nearest paved street among the
control group was 0.66 street blocks (from 1.35 in 2006 to
0.69 in 2009), the estimated downward bias is around 2.2
percentage points, which is not statistically significant and
is relatively small compared to the RF and 2SLS estimates
reported below.29
28 In table A3 in the online appendix, we report item nonresponse rates in
2009 for each variable and their differences by treatment status for units that
responded in 2006. None of the item response rates is significantly different
between intent-to-treat and control groups.
29 In table A4 in the online appendix, we present an analysis of spillovers,
not only for home values, but for transportation and labor supply outcomes:
cost of taxi, time to city center, weekly hours of work, and monthly log
labor income. Spillovers onto the control group across these additional
dimensions are either statistically insignificant or economically irrelevant.
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Table 4.—Experimental Effects of Street Pavement on Immigration Decision and Immigrant Characteristics






Immigrant Characteristics: Log(PCE) Household Appliances Vehicle Ownership
Mean Control Mean Control Mean Control
RF 2SLS (2009) RF 2SLS (2009) RF 2SLS (2009)
−0.033 −0.060 6.90 0.297 0.532 2.04 0.071 0.127 0.284
(0.095) (0.170) (0.055) (0.222) (0.383) (0.154) (0.105) (0.178) (0.060)
[181] [181] [83] [183] [183] [84] [183] [183] [84]
RF column uses assignment to pavement (Z) as independent variable. 2SLS column instruments pavement status (D) with assignment to pavement (Z). Regressions include a constant. Estimation takes survey weights
into account. Standard errors clustered at the pavement-project level are in parentheses. The number of observations is in brackets. Significance levels are reported only for RF and 2SLS: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value
< 0.05, *p-value < 0.1.
Figure 4.—Change in House Value in Control Group
The figure uses the estimates from a regression of the change in home value on a constant and three
indicator variables of change in distance (1 block, 2 blocks, 3+ blocks) in the control group.
While our test for connectivity effects gives us some infor-
mation on indirect effects that vary with distance to the
nearest paved street, it does not shed light on indirect effects
that may operate more globally. Indeed, our empirical design
cannot account for effects due to the increase in the num-
ber of places one can drive to after paving or for paving
increasing the size of the market available to support down-
town economic activity, which could benefit everyone in the
city. Perhaps in our context of streets in a circular city (and
not of roads connecting different cities) and given that the
fraction of treated properties due to the intervention in the
city is small (around 5%), these global effects are less likely
to be important. In any case, some caution is warranted in
interpreting our 2SLS estimates as potential lower bounds
for the TOT effects.30
30 If we compare the mean characteristics of units on Z = 1 streets that
were paved by 2009 (compliers) with those on Z = 1 streets that remained
unpaved by 2009 (noncompliers), the only significant differences between
compliers and noncompliers arise in terms of distance to the downtown
in minutes, credit card prevalence, bank account prevalence, and rent. For
compliers, it takes less time to commute to the city center than for non-
compliers, they pay higher rents, and they are more likely to have a credit
Table 5.—Experimental Effects of Street Pavement on PropertyValues
RF 2SLS Mean Control (2009)
Log professional appraisal 0.09∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 11.52
of property value (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
[548] [548] [253]
Log professional appraisal 0.32∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 10.07
of land value (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
[548] [548] [253]
Log owner estimate of 0.16∗ 0.25∗ 12.01
property value (0.09) (0.15) (0.08)
[531] [531] [262]
Log rent 0.18∗ 0.31∗∗ 6.54
(0.08) (0.13) (0.11)
[56] [56] [22]
Log transaction price recent 0.44 0.85 10.82
purchasesa (0.65) (1.22) (0.38)
[29] [29] [8]
RF column uses assignment to pavement (Z) as independent variable. 2SLS column instruments pave-
ment status (D) with assignment to pavement (Z). Regressions include a constant and the corresponding
dependent variable at baseline. For log rent, we use as baseline control the rent paid by the family previ-
ously living in the same house in 2006. The estimation takes survey weights into account. Standard errors
clustered at the pavement-project level are in parentheses. The number of observations is in brackets.
Significance levels are reported only for RF and 2SLS: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value <
0.1. aTransaction price is the amount paid by new homeowners (arriving between baseline and follow-up);
hence the dependent variable at baseline is not included.
IV. Experimental Effects of Street Pavement
A. Effects on Property Values
We begin by presenting, in table 5, our main experimen-
tal estimates for the effects of street pavement on home and
land values. RF and 2SLS estimated effects are presented
in the first two columns and the mean of the correspond-
ing variable for the control group in 2009 is in the third.
Using the professional appraisal measures, we find that pave-
ment increases home values by 17% and land values by
54 log points (or 72%). According to homeowners’ val-
uations, we estimate that street pavement raises property
card and a bank account. This suggests that pavement was first rolled out
in streets closer to the downtown. Note that the interpretation we give to
our 2SLS estimate is the effect of moving from a situation in which there
is a positive but small probability of getting paved to one in which it is 1.
This is different from the estimate of assigning a probability of 0 to getting
paved and then getting it, but we believe the former provides an estimate of
the policy-relevant parameter.
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values by 28%. The fact that two independent measures
of property value move in the same direction suggests
that paving accounts for substantial rises in home values.
Note that the difference in the magnitudes of the esti-
mated impacts with the two measures is not statistically
significant.31
Table 5 also shows that rents on treated streets are 36%
higher than rents on control streets and that the amount paid
for recently purchased houses on intent-to-treat and paved
streets are 55% and 85 log points (134%) higher than in
the control group, although it must be conceded that this last
estimate is imprecise on account of the small sample size and
the fact that we cannot control for the outcome at baseline.
Nevertheless, it is reassuring to corroborate the qualitative
findings obtained from appraisals and homeowner valua-
tions with these supplemental indicators. The similarity of
the effects on owners’ self-reported prices (a stock vari-
able) and rental rates (a flow variable) is remarkable and
corroborates our previous results on the absence of anticipa-
tion effects. We note that the absence of anticipation effects
described in table 2 is consistent with the small differences
reported in table 5 when comparing the estimated effects on
self-reported house value measures (RF: 0.16, 2SLS: 0.25)
against the estimated effects on house rental rates (RF: 0.18,
2SLS: 0.31).
We interpret these estimates as pointing to local infras-
tructure affecting homeowners through land value increases,
which is consistent with previous findings documented
by Brueckner (1982) and Haughwout (2002), among
others.
B. Effects on Consumption and Credit
We now turn to estimate the effects of street pavement
on the consumption of durable and nondurable goods. The
results are reported in table 6. Street pavement provision
has a strong positive effect on the number of household
appliances owned by the household. Out of six household
appliances, control households have an average of 2.4 goods,
while the mean for households on paved streets is 2.7 goods
(12% higher). There is also a significant effect on the rate of
ownership of a motorized vehicle (motorcycle, car, or truck).
Whereas the household-vehicle index is 0.25 in the control
group, in the treated group, it is 0.35, corresponding to a
43% increase.
In Acayucan, as in many other cities in developing coun-
tries, households improve and expand their houses over time.
We find that street pavement leads to a doubling in the aver-
age number of home improvements a household engaged
in over the previous six months: from 0.4 to 0.8 reforms.
The types of home improvements we inquired about related
31 Focusing on short-tenured homeowners (5 years or less living in the
dwelling), we obtain RF and 2SLS estimates of 0.24 (SE = 0.27) and 0.36
(SE = 0.38), which are imprecisely estimated on account of the reduced
number of observations (N = 49).
Table 6.—Experimental Effects of Street Pavement on Consumption
Mean Control
RF 2SLS (2009)
Household appliances (0–6) 0.166∗ 0.274∗ 2.36
(0.091) (0.147) (0.077)
[900] [900] [413]
Vehicles (car/truck/motorcycle) (0–3) 0.063∗ 0.104∗ 0.245
(0.037) (0.059) (0.027)
[900] [900] [413]
Home improvements (0–11) 0.258∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.400
(0.112) (0.202) (0.064)
[900] [900] [413]
Materials purchased 0.052∗ 0.086∗ 0.146
for home improvement (=1) (0.027) (0.046) (0.021)
[894] [894] [409]
Monthly log per 0.047 0.077 6.73
capita expenditure (0.047) (0.075) (0.040)
[864] [864] [403]
Monthly log sum of 0.035 0.057 6.62
itemized expenditures (0.049) (0.079) (0.041)
per capita [883] [883] [409]
RF column uses assignment to pavement (Z) as independent variable. 2SLS column instruments pave-
ment status (D) with assignment to pavement (Z). Regressions include a constant and the corresponding
dependent variable at baseline. Estimation takes survey weights into account. Standard errors are clustered
at the pavement-project level in parentheses. Number of observations is in brackets. Significance levels
reported only for RF and 2SLS: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1.
to flooring, plumbing, electrical installations, toilets, room
remodeling, and air-conditioning. The effect is confirmed by
the 50% increase in the likelihood that the family had bought
materials for home improvements in the previous six months
(from 15% of households in the control group to 24% among
the treated group).
Finally, we find that the provision of street pavement
has no statistically significant effect on monthly per capita
expenditure (i.e., nondurable consumption) measured by the
sum of itemized expenditures or a direct measure of total
household expenditures.
Credit effects are reported in table 7. We find that
pavement increases the percentage of individuals who use
collateral-based credit from close to 2% among the control
group to nearly 5% among the treated. The increased use of
collateral-based credit is also reflected in the average loan
size, on average 135 pesos among the control group and
1,643 pesos (equivalent to 2 months per capita expenditure)
among the treated, for a more than tenfold increase.32 While
this is an important finding, we do not have the required
information to determine whether the increase in collateral-
based credit use is due to an increase in either the demand
or the supply of credit (Field & Torero, 2004). For all other
types of credit, such as noncollateral based, credit from fam-
ily and friends, credit from government entities, and credit
from informal sources, we do not observe any changes in
either the number of individuals using credit or the extent of
the credit.33
32 Note that the average secured loan conditional on having a loan is 22,422
pesos, sufficient to cover the cost of a used car in Mexico.
33 We also find a 7 percentage point increase in bank accounts over a
control group rate of 14%, which is close to being statistically significant
at the 10% level.
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Table 7.—Experimental Effects of Street Pavement on Credit Use
Mean Control
RF 2SLS (2009)
Collateral-based credit (=1)a 0.017∗ 0.028∗ 0.018
(0.009) (0.014) (0.004)
[1,984] [1,984] [937]
Collateral-based credit 914∗ 1, 508∗ 135
amounta (516) (787) (45)
[1,984] [1,984] [937]
Noncollateral-based credit (=1)a −0.001 −0.001 0.069
(0.012) (0.020) (0.009)
[1,984] [1,984] [937]
Noncollateral-based credit 256 422 823
amounta (360) (589) (208)
[1,984] [1,984] [937]
Credit from family and 0.001 0.002 0.004
friends (=1)a (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
[1,984] [1,984] [937]
Informal private credit (=1)a 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
[1,984] [1,984] [937]
Credit card (=1) 0.033 0.055 0.155
(0.032) (0.052) (0.021)
[890] [890] [410]
Bank account (=1) 0.043 0.071 0.138
(0.027) (0.045) (0.020)
[891] [891] [410]
RF column uses assignment to pavement (Z) as independent variable. 2SLS column instruments pave-
ment status (D) with assignment to pavement (Z). Regressions include a constant and the corresponding
dependent variable at baseline. Estimation takes survey weights into account. Standard errors clustered
at the pavement-project level are in parentheses. The number of observations is in brackets. Significance
levels reported only for RF and 2SLS: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. aDenotes
individual-level outcomes.




Cost of taxi to −0.360 −0.587 18.14
city center (pesos) (0.487) (0.767) (0.697)
[889] [889] [407]
Time to city center (minutes) −0.598 −0.989 19.04
(0.920) (1.52) (0.789)
[899] [899] [412]
Distance to nearest paved street −0.46∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ 0.67
(street blocks) (0.10) (0.13) (0.08)
[898] [898] [411]
Weekly work hoursa 2.31 3.77 47.29
(1.42) (2.46) (1.14)
[927] [927] [429]
Monthly log labor incomea 0.034 0.057 7.83
(0.055) (0.087) (0.047)
[790] [790] [382]
Plans to migrate −0.063∗ −0.104∗ 0.474
in search of work (=1) (0.033) (0.055) (0.027)
[801] [801] [370]
RF column uses assignment to pavement (Z) as independent variable. 2SLS column instruments pave-
ment status (D) with assignment to pavement (Z). Regressions include a constant and the corresponding
dependent variable at baseline. Estimation takes survey weights into account. Standard errors clustered
at the pavement project level are in parentheses. The number of observations is in brackets. Significance
levels are reported only for RF and 2SLS: ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1. aDenotes
individual-level outcomes.
C. Effects on Transportation and Labor
We measure the effects of street pavement on transporta-
tion costs in table 8 in terms of money and time: the cost
of a taxi to the city center and the time it takes to go to
the city center by one’s usual means of transportation. We
find that in both respects, the savings for those who benefit
from pavement over the control group are neither large (0.6
pesos and less than 1 minute) nor statistically significant. In
addition, field visits did not reveal new bus routes in these
neighborhoods after pavement was provided.
Similarly, we find no effect on labor outcomes in terms
of either labor supply or earnings (in table A5 in the online
appendix we report no effect on the extensive margin either).
However, we do find a reduction in the percentage of families
for which a household member plans to migrate in search of
work, which fell from 47% to 37% as a result of treatment.
Finally, and regarding other outcomes, table A5 shows
no significant effects on either school attendance or self-
reported health for adults or children (see Cattaneo et al.,
2009, for health impacts of providing cement floors in
Mexico).
V. Understanding Pavement Effects on
Household Outcomes
While the previous analysis is crucial to assess the causal
effects of street pavement on the lives of the poor, it does
not tell us how pavement affects household behavior. In this
section we seek to understand what drives the observed
changes in household behavior: significant increases in
household appliances, the number of home improvements,
and the acquisition of motorized vehicles.
Given the increase in property values, that homeowners
represent 95% of the households in our sample, the doubling
of collateral-based credit use from financial institutions,34
together with the fact that we do not find effects on trans-
portation costs or labor market outcomes, we investigate the
role of credit use in explaining durable goods consumption
by means of a correlational (descriptive) analysis.
In particular, we investigate the role of credit use in
explaining the durable goods consumption.35 In order to
accomplish this, we regress the indices of household appli-
ances (0–6), home improvements (0–11), and motorized
vehicles (0–3) on the amount of (collateralized) credit in
2006, in 2009, and the interaction of the two, controlling or
not for the corresponding lagged dependent variable.
Table 9 displays the results of these regressions. The coef-
ficient on the credit 2009 variable can be interpreted as the
correlation between credit use and the relevant index for
households with no credit in 2006. For the household appli-
ances index, this coefficient is positive and significant. This
suggests that among households with no credit in 2006,
those who experienced an increase in credit use in 2009
(used a credit line in 2009) were also more likely to buy
durable goods. While this may be consistent with the credit
34 Loan size across all adults went from virtually 0 to 1,643 pesos (200
U.S. dollars at 2009 PPP exchange rate), equivalent to 2 months per capita
expenditure.
35 Because the primary residence typically constitutes the single most
important depository of wealth for homeowners, changes in its asset value
can be expected to have important consumption effects (Campbell & Cocco,
2007) as long as households can borrow against housing wealth or dissave
(Muellbauer, 2007).
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Table 9.—Assessing Mechanisms
Dependent Variable: Household Appliances Home Improvements Vehicles
(0–6) (0–11) (0–3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit 09 0.026∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.002 −0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Credit 06 × Credit 09 0.023∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Credit 06 0.027∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008 0.006 0.014∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Household Appliances 06 0.646∗∗∗
(0.038)




Number of observations 824 824 824 824 824 824
Estimation takes survey weights into account. Standard errors clustered at the pavement-project level are in parentheses. ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05, *p-value < 0.1.
Table 10.—Cost-Benefit Analysis
Plots Average Value Effect of Pavement Gains per Plot Total Gains Gain/Cost Ratio
814 27,844∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 15,081∗∗∗ 12,275,585∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
Standard error (1,508) (0.10) (3,006) (2,446,579) (0.22)
95% Confidence interval [0.66, 1.51]
The plots column reports the number of plots abutting streets that were paved (residential, nonresidential, and vacant). The average value of a plot is estimated by means of professional appraisals. The effect coefficient
is taken from table 5. Total costs are municipal-authority estimates of costs of the pavement program undertaken as part of this study. Figures are in 2009 Mexican pesos. The 2009 PPP exchange rate was 8.5 pesos to
the U.S. dollar. The nominal February 2009 exchange rate was 14.6 Mexican pesos to the U.S. dollar. Standard errors clustered at the pavement-project level are in parentheses. ***p-value < 0.01, **p-value < 0.05,
*p-value < 0.1.
constraint relaxation channel, this significant correlation is
not present for the home improvements and motorized vehi-
cles indices. However, what is positive and significant across
the board is the interaction between credit in 2006 and credit
in 2009. This suggests that the increase in the consumption
of durable goods (broadly defined) was concentrated mostly
among households that already had access to credit in 2006.
For households not using credit at baseline, the effects are
present only for household appliances, but these are pre-
cisely the goods less likely to be financed by secured loans
(and more likely to be financed through dissaving or non-
secured loans). Hence we interpret the overall evidence as
pointing to a wealth effect rather than to a relaxation of
credit constraints as the main force behind the increase in
durable goods consumption.36
VI. Cost-Benefit Analysis
With zero marginal price for street use, the benefits of a
paved street are defined as the increase in consumers’ sur-
plus that users derive from the street improvement. Users of
a street can be divided into two sets of individuals: those
living on properties abutting the street that is paved and
users not living there. We obtain an estimate of consumer
surplus for the group of individuals living on properties
adjacent to paved streets, being unable to obtain estimates
for those living in other streets. Hence, to the extent that
36 Of course, part of the increase in vehicle ownership might reflect an
increase in the marginal utility of having a motorized vehicle due to street
pavement.
we are not capturing indirect benefits, ours will be an
underestimate.
Our consumers’ surplus estimate is obtained by summing
up the increases in land value over plots on treated streets.37
A similar approach is used in Jacoby (2000).38 Construction
costs are measured as the sum of municipal expenditures on
each street that was treated with pavement. Specifically, the
municipality reported that the total cost of paving the streets
in this study amounted to 11, 304, 642 pesos.
Table 10 reports the results of this cost-benefit analy-
sis. There are 814 plots on treated streets. The average plot
on these streets is valued at 27,844 pesos. Multiplying this
value by the estimated effect of street pavement on land
value (0.54) gives an average benefit per plot of 15,081
pesos, for a total gain of 12,275,585 pesos. The last col-
umn shows that the increases in land values represent 109%
of construction costs and we cannot reject that the ratio is
equal to 1. Our cost-benefit analysis indicates that the eco-
nomic returns to street pavement in this context are about
as large as the construction costs, even if we consider the
typical deadweight losses generated by taxation in develop-
ing countries (Auriol & Wartlers, 2012). Furthermore, it is
worth noting that according to the public finance literature
37 When performing the cost-benefit analysis, there are two ways to pro-
ceed. One is to focus on home values, in which case we clearly need to
account for the costs of home improvements. Alternatively, we can focus
on land values. This is the path we follow here. According to the assessor
(and consistent with the valuations), home improvements are not included
in the valuation of the land, so focusing on land values sidesteps this issue.
38 A more structural strategy to estimate consumers’ surplus can be found
in Kaufman and Quigley (1987).
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on the valuation of public goods based on property value
capitalization (Cellini et al., 2010), a ratio of 1 is consistent
with an efficient level of public good provision.
Of course, the cost-benefit analysis conducted in this
section provides a benchmark. It is valid as long as markets
are complete and perfect, so that the pavement amenity is
perfectly capitalized into land values. The higher the degree
of market imperfections, the higher the deviation from our
benchmark and the “real” benefits of the intervention.
VII. Conclusion
What can be learned from this paper? First, provision
of urban infrastructure is capitalized into property values.
First-time street asphalting of residential streets in poor
neighborhoods in developing countries leads to substantial
property appreciation effects that directly benefit owners
of properties lining those infrastructure projects. Second,
the increased property wealth is transformed quite rapidly
(within two years) into tangible benefits: the consumption
of household appliances, home improvements, and vehicle
ownership increase significantly. Because incomes are not
significantly affected by this policy, the durable goods are
financed through increased credit use, although most of this
occurs among households that already had access to credit.
We interpret these results as suggestive evidence that street
pavement generates wealth effects rather than easing credit
constraints.
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